Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed Languages by Swamy, Nikhil et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (CIS) Department of Computer & Information Science
2006
Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed
Languages
Nikhil Swamy
University of Maryland - College Park
Michael Hicks
University of Maryland - College Park
Stephen Tse
University of Pennsylvania
Stephan A. Zdancewic
University of Pennsylvania, stevez@cis.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
Nikhil Swamy, Michael Hicks, Stephen Tse, and Steve Zdancewic. Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed Languages. In Proc. of 19th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 202-216. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2006.
DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.17
©2006 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes
or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works
must be obtained from the IEEE.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/584
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nikhil Swamy, Michael Hicks, Stephen Tse, and Stephan A. Zdancewic, "Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed Languages", .
January 2006.
Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed Languages
Abstract
This paper presents RX, a new security-typed programming language with features intended to make the
management of information-flow policies more practical. Security labels in RX, in contrast to prior
approaches, are defined in terms of owned roles, as found in the RT role-based trust-management framework.
Role-based security policies allow flexible delegation, and our language RX provides constructs through
which programs can robustly update policies and react to policy updates dynamically. Our dynamic semantics
use statically verified transactions to eliminate illegal information flows across updates, which we call transitive
flows. Because policy updates can be observed through dynamic queries, policy updates can potentially reveal
sensitive information. As such, RX considers policy statements themselves to be potentially confidential
information and subject to information-flow metapolicies.
Disciplines
Computer Sciences
Comments
Nikhil Swamy, Michael Hicks, Stephen Tse, and Steve Zdancewic. Managing Policy Updates in Security-
Typed Languages. In Proc. of 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), pages 202-216.
IEEE Computer Society Press, 2006.
DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2006.17
©2006 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this
material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be
obtained from the IEEE.
This conference paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/584
Managing Policy Updates in Security-Typed Languages
Nikhil Swamy Michael Hicks
University of Maryland
Stephen Tse Steve Zdancewic
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
This paper presents RX, a new security-typed program-
ming language with features intended to make the man-
agement of information-flow policies more practical. Se-
curity labels in RX, in contrast to prior approaches, are
defined in terms of owned roles, as found in the RT role-
based trust-management framework. Role-based security
policies allows flexible delegation, and our language RX
provides constructs through which programs can robustly
update policies and react to policy updates dynamically.
Our dynamic semantics use statically verified transactions
to eliminate illegal information flows across updates, which
we call transitive flow. Because policy updates can be ob-
served through dynamic queries, policy updates can poten-
tially reveal sensitive information. As such, RX considers
policy statements themselves to be potentially confidential
information and subject to information-flow metapolicies.
1 Introduction
A large body of work has demonstrated that type sys-
tems and other forms of static analysis can prove the
absence of undesirable information flows within a pro-
gram [21]. Security-typed programming languages extend
standard types with labels that specify security policies on
the allowable uses of typed data. Such labels are typically
ordered by a lattice that expresses multi-level security poli-
cies for properties like confidentiality. For example, labels
may denote principals like Bob and Alice , and if, accord-
ing to the security lattice, Alice v Bob holds, then any data
labeled Alice can be viewed by Bob. In security-typed lan-
guages, compile-time type-checking ensures that the poli-
cies expressed by labels are enforced, and thus one can
prove, in advance of program execution, that a program ad-
heres to a particular information-flow policy.
Most existing security-typed languages assume that a
program’s security policy does not change once the pro-
gram begins its execution. This is an unrealistic assumption
for long-running programs. For operating systems, network
servers, and database systems, the privileges of principals
are likely to change, such as new principals entering a sys-
tem, or existing principals leaving or changing duties.
On the other hand, it would be unwise to simply allow
the policy to change at arbitrary program points. For exam-
ple, if the program is unaware of a revocation in the security
lattice it could allow a principal to view data illegally. More
subtly, a combination of policy changes could violate sep-
aration of duty, inadvertently allowing a principal to view
data that he is permitted to see by neither the old nor the
new policy. We call this channel of information leaks across
updates transitive flow.
This paper presents a new security-typed language RX
that permits security policies to change during program ex-
ecution. RX has two distinguishing features. First, labels
in RX are defined in terms of roles as found in the role-
based access control languages of the RT framework [14].
A role names a set of principals, and role ordering in the se-
curity lattice is defined by subset. Second, RX programs are
permitted to dynamically update the current role definitions
and dynamic queries can be used to observe policy changes
beyond that point. Programmers can use database-style
transactions to denote code that must use a single consis-
tent policy, preventing unintended information flows across
updates. Policy updates that would violate this consistency
cause the program to roll back to a consistent state.
In designing RX we had to consider how to manage
changes to policy most effectively. We found that once
we allow policies to change within a program, policies
themselves can become conduits of sensitive information,
or conversely, sensitive information can be revealed by
changes to policy. To prevent these situations, RX uses
metapolicies that define which principals can view a par-
ticular role, and which principals trust a role’s definition.
The inherent administrative model of the RT policy lan-
guages suggests natural choices for these metapolicies. For
example, in the RT framework, a role has a designated
owner that is responsible for administering the role’s con-
tents. That is, only when the program is acting in a way
trusted by that owner may the role be changed.
The RT policy language has other useful features that
ease the administration of policy in use by a security-typed
program. RT supports fine-grained delegation which can
1
limit the impact of policy changes on information flows.
Also, using named roles as labels provides a useful level
of indirection: the constituents of a role may change when
the name of the role does not. This may reduce the need
for data to be relabeled to effect a policy change. As far
as we are aware, RX is the first programming language to
employ a role-based specification language for defining se-
curity policies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3
presents RXcore, the mostly-standard core of RX for which
security labels are defined as RT roles. Section 3 presents
the full RX language, which extends the RXcore label model
to support the added features of policy queries, policy up-
dates, and transactions. Section 4 states security theorems
that hold for RX. The paper concludes with a discussion of
related work in Section 5 and future directions in Section 6.
2 A Role-based Security-Typed Language
We begin with by motivating using roles as labels in a
language that supports policy updates. We follow this with a
presentation of the core features of RT0, the simplest mem-
ber of the RT family of role-based policy languages. Fi-
nally, we present RXcore, an imperative security-typed lan-
guage for which security labels are defined as roles.
2.1 Existing Label Models
Most existing security-typed languages use the lattice
model of information flow [28] in which an information flow
policy is defined by a lattice (L,v), where ` ∈ L is a label
(or security level), and labels are ordered by the relation v.
A typical choice (e.g., in FlowCaml [23]) is to define the
members of L as atomic names, and to definev by a policy
Π that defines the ordering among the names. This kind of
label model allows a program to define labels like L and H ,
which mean “low” and “high” security, respectively, and a
policy Π = {L v H }, which indicates that L is less re-
strictive than H . Generally speaking, labels can either be
atomic—H and L in this example—or the join `1 unionsq `2 of
labels `1 and `2; here unionsq is induced by the v relation.
The language Jif [16] supports the more sophisticated
labels of the decentralized label model (DLM). DLM la-
bels are defined in terms of principals, and have three parts:
an owner, a reader set (those principals allowed to read the
value), and an integrity set (those principals who trust the
value). Jif policies Π define delegation relationships be-
tween principals: ifΠ ` P1 v P2 then P2 may “act for” P1.
The ordering on labels is induced by this ordering among
principals. For example, any data labeled solely by owner
P1 may be read or written by P2 (as well as any principals
which may act for P2). DLM labels have been used in a
number of interesting ways such as supporting distributed
computation [32].
2.2 Motivations for Roles
The problem with these label models is that they offer no
administrative support for changes to policy. This is not sur-
prising because existing languages typically make the sim-
plifying assumption that the security policy is fixed for the
duration of a program’s execution. If policy updates are
to be supported, a reasonable administrative model should
be able to provide answers to the following questions. (1)
Who is allowed to make changes to the security policy? (2)
What parts of the policy are permitted to change? (3) How
should those changes be reflected in the running program?
(4) When are such changes permitted to take place?
Rather than develop an administrative model for the
DLM, we looked instead to the body of work on formal
policy languages for which administrative models already
exist. Role-based policy languages [19, 2, 7, 14] in particu-
lar suggest a natural label model. In particular, a role, which
is a name that represents a set of principals, can be treated
as a label, and the ordering between labels can be defined
in terms of subset on the contents of roles according to the
policy. Indeed, in the simple example above, the two atomic
labels L and H are essentially being treated as roles.
We chose to use RT0 as the core of the label model for
RX. RT0 is the simplest member of the role-based policy
language frameworkRT [14]. UsingRT roles as labels has
a number of attractive administrative features:
1. Ownership: An RT role defined as having an owner
responsible for the role’s definition; a given principal
can own many roles. Only a role’s owner is allowed to
change the definition of that role.
2. Membership and Delegation: An RT policy permits
delegation at the granularity of roles, in which one role
may be defined in part by the contents of another role.
This provides better control than the DLM, which only
permits delegation between principals. To see the dis-
tinction, say that in Jif we define a special principal
Manager that represents the role of Manager in a com-
pany. To express that Alice is a member of this role, a
DLM policy Π would include the statementManager
v Alice; e.g., whatever a Manager can view, Alice
can view as well. Assuming an administrative model
that would allow Alice to delegate to whomever she
wishes, Alice can state that Alice v Bob, with the ef-
fect of making Bob a manager sinceManager vAlice
v Bob. By contrast, role membership and role del-
egation in RT are separate concepts. Roles have an
owner, and membership is strictly under the owner’s
control: the owner can either include a principal in a
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role, or delegate (part of) the definition of a role to an-
other role. Membership does not imply delegation.
3. Indirection: Defining labels as roles provides a useful
level of indirection because the membership of a role
may change while the label on data stays the same.
That is, a security policy of a data can be modified
without requiring the data to be relabeled.
These points taken together answer the first three of the
four questions posed previously. The question (4) of when
policy changes are allowed to occur depends on what the
program is doing when a proposed update is available; we
consider this question in the next section.
For the remainder of this section, we first present the
RT0 policy language that forms the core of our label model.
Then we present the syntax and typing rules of the RXcore,
the core of our full language RX, which uses RT0 roles for
security labels.
2.3 RT0: A Role-based Policy Language
RT0 is the simplest member of the RT framework of
role-based policy languages [14]; it is summarized in Fig-
ure 1. A role ρ in RT0 has the form P.r, where princi-
pal P is the role’s owner and r is the role’s name. We
often write A, B, etc. as sample principals P . We use
predicate owner(ρ) to extract the owner of ρ (and thus
owner(P.r) = P ).
Policy statements s have two forms1 P.r ←
{P1, . . . , Pn} and P1.r1 ← P2.r2. The first form indicates
simple membership, that principals Pi are members of role
P.r. The second form is a simple role delegation statement,
which indicates that all members of the role P2.r2 are also
members of P1.r1. We use the predicate roledef (s) to de-
note the role ρ defined by the policy statement s: for exam-
ple, roledef (A.r ← {B}) is A.r.
The semantics of a role ρ is a set of principals and is
determined by the function [[·]]Π according to a policy Π.
(Li et al [14] develop a formal definition of this semantics
function.) Intuitively, [[ρ]]Π is defined by all of the simple
members Pi of ρ where ρ ← Pi ∈ Π, along with the mem-
bers [[ρi]]Π where ρ← ρi ∈ Π.
An example of an RT0 policy Π is given in Figure 2,
which models the privacy of a patient’s health care docu-
ments. The example defines roles owned by three princi-
pals: Pat , a patient; Clinic, a specialized medical treat-
ment center where Pat is currently a patient; and DrPhil ,
a doctor not affiliated with the clinic. The policy state-
ments define several roles that capture the affiliations just
mentioned. Pat .doctors is defined via two statements. The
first says that DrSue (a family doctor) is Pat’s doctor. The
1RT0 also includes intersection and linking inclusion: statements
which are supported by our label model, but which we elide for simplicity.
principal P
role name r
role ρ ::= P.r
policy stmt s ::= ρ← {P1, . . . , Pn}
| ρ1 ← ρ2
policy Π ::= {s1, . . . , sn}
role semantics [[ρ]]Π (see text)
Figure 1. The syntax of RT0 policy language.
Pat .doctors ← {DrSue}
Pat .doctors ← Clinic.staff
Pat .insurers ← {BCBS}
Pat .healthRecords ← Pat .doctors
Clinic.staff ← {DrAlice ,DrBob}
Clinic.insuranceCos ← {BCBS , Aetna}
DrPhil .self ← {DrPhil}
Figure 2. A sample health care policy in RT0.
second statement is a delegation to Clinic.staff, indicating
that Pat’s doctors also include the practitioners that work
at the clinic, which according to the policy in Figure 2,
is currently just the two principals DrAlice and DrBob.
Pat .insurers includes all insurance companies with which
Pat has a policy—this is the single company BCBS de-
fined through simple membership. Clinic.insuranceCos is
the set of insurance companies accepted by the clinic. Fi-
nally, the last role definition owned byDrPhil includes only
himself.
For instance, the semantics of the role Pat .doctors and
of Pat .insurers according to this sample policy are:
[[Pat .doctors]]Π = {DrAlice,DrBob,DrSue}
[[Pat .insurers]]Π = {BCBS}
2.4 The RXcore Programming Language
RXcore is a simple imperative language with security la-
bels. Its syntax is shown at the top of Figure 3. Labels `
in RXcore are either atomic labels L or the join of two la-
bels according to the lattice ordering. An atomic label is
merely a role ρ. Labels are ordered according to the judg-
ment Π ` `1 v `2, where Π is an RT0 policy as described
above. For atomic labels, this ordering is according to the
semantics of roles as sets:
Π ` ρ1 v ρ2 ⇐⇒ [[ρ2]]Π ⊆ [[ρ1]]Π
Note that the label ordering relation (v) is the reverse of
the subset relation (⊆) over role membership. That is, a role
that has a larger set of members lower security than a role
with fewer members, since strictly more principals can read
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atomic labels L ::= ρ
compound labels ` ::= L | ` unionsq `
policy context Q ::= Π
typing context Ω ::= (Γ, pc, Q)
expressions E ::= i | x | E1 + E2
statements S ::= skip | x := E | S1;S2
| while (E) S | if (E) S1 S2
Ω ` i : ` Ω ` x : Ω.Γ(x) Ω ` skip
Ω ` S1 Ω ` S2
Ω ` S1;S2
Ω ` E1 : `1 Ω ` E2 : `2
Ω ` E1 + E2 : `1 unionsq `2
Ω ` E : `′ Ω[pc = Ω.pc unionsq `′] ` Si i ∈ {1, 2}
Ω ` if (E) S1 S2
Ω ` E : `′ Ω[pc = Ω.pc unionsq `′] ` S
Ω ` while (E) S
Ω ` x : ` Ω ` E : `1 Ω.Q ` `1 v ` Ω.Q ` Ω.pc v `
Ω ` x := E
Figure 3. RXcore syntax and typing.
data labeled by it. Extending this ordering to compound
labels is straightforward by interpreting the join operator as
set intersection.
There are two typing judgments for RXcore, shown at the
bottom of Figure 3. Expression typings Ω ` E : ` state that
in context Ω the expression E has a security level `. State-
ment typings Ω ` S state that statement S is well formed
with respect to the context Ω. The context Ω has three el-
ements: the environment Γ, the program counter label pc
and the policy context Q. Here Γ is a map from variables to
their security labels, and pc is simply a label ` that is used
to bound the effect of writing to memory, to prevent indirect
information flows [21]. We discuss Q below. In the typing
rules we project the elements of theΩ tuple via the dot nota-
tion; for example, Ω.pc is the pc component of Ω. We write
Ω[pc = pc′] to represent the context that is identical to Ω
except the pc component is replaced with the value pc′, and
likewise for other components of a context.
As in other security-typed languages, type checking in
RXcore is equivalent to security checking: if program S type
checks, when executed it will not leak information in vio-
lation of its policy. The policy context Q is a compile-time
approximation of the actual policyΠ at run time with which
S will be executed. In RXcore and most security-typed lan-
guages, Q and Π are synonymous. That is, in these lan-
guages, it is assumed that the policy to be applied to the
entire execution of S is known when S is compiled. We
distinguish between policy context Q and policy Π now in
anticipation of the full RX in Section 3, for which policiesΠ
will evolve over time. Other than this difference, the typing
rules in Figure 3 are standard [24].
To illustrate how the typing judgments of RX0 pre-
vent illegal information flows, consider the rule for the if-
statement. The branches of the statement S1 and S2 carry
information about the value of the expressionE. Therefore,
the rule checks each branch in a context where the effect
lower-bound pc is strengthened to be no less than the se-
curity level of E. This has an impact on how assignment
statements are checked. Notice the last premise of the rule
for the assignment statement. This premise states that the
label of the location x being written to must not be less than
the effect lower-bound. This ensures that if the assignment
were to occur within a branch of an if-statement, then infor-
mation about the expression that appears in the guard of the
if-statement is not leaked to a low-security variable.
3 RX: Adding Policy Updates to RX0
This section presents the remaining features of the full
language RX, which include (1) policy queries by which
programs can examine the current policy during execution,
and (2) policy updates, by which programs can add or delete
statements from the current policy. The type system ensures
none of these operations will leak confidential information,
as proven in the next section. In addition, because pol-
icy updates are a potentially dangerous operation—adding
a new delegation statement effectively declassifies informa-
tion [11]—RX adapts the integrity constraints from previ-
ous work on robust declassification [31, 17]. Intuitively,
the owner of a role ρ must trust the integrity of the deci-
sion to update policy statements that define ρ. Interestingly,
changes to policy become a potential conduit for illegal in-
formation flow. As such, we use metapolicies [12] for pro-
tecting the confidentiality and integrity of roles.
3.1 RX Syntax
The syntax of RX is shown in Figure 4. It differs from
RXcore in several ways. Atomic labels, L, now include ab-
stract operators C(ρ) and I(ρ) to represent metapolicies
that define the confidentiality and integrity of roles. Like
roles themselves, metapolicies are interpreted as sets of
principals. Full labels, `, are now joins of pairs consisting
of a confidentiality component and an integrity component,
which restricts where policy updates may occur.
Policy queries, q, are used in the statement if (q) S1 S2
to branch to S1 or S2 depending on whether the query L1 v
L2 holds according to the current dynamic policy Π. Policy
contexts Q used for type checking the program now consist
of a set of queries {q1, . . . , qn} that represent the knowledge
gained about the run time policy through policy queries.
The statement update ∆ is used to change the current
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atomic labels L ::= ρ | C(ρ) | I(ρ)
compound labels ` ::= (LC , LI) | ` unionsq `
queries q ::= L1 v L2
policy context Q ::= {q1, . . . , qn}
update δ ::= add s | del s
updates ∆ ::= δ | δ,∆
statements S ::= . . .
| if (q) S1 S2
| update∆
| transQ S
Figure 4. RX syntax, extending RXcore.
policy by adding or removing a collection of policy state-
ments ∆ = δ1, . . . , δn.
Finally, the statement transQ S creates a transaction
with policy context invariant Q. Such a transaction ensures
that, although the policy Π may be updated within S, mod-
ifications to memory by the statement S are consistent with
respect to a single policy.
We present the intuitive idea behind these new constructs
by example, followed by the formal dynamic and static se-
mantics, and conclude with a discussion of metapolicies.
3.2 Motivating Examples
Example 1. A fragment of a program that might be used to
create the sample health care policy in Figure 2:
if(patAcceptsTreatment)
if(Clinic.insuranceCos v Pat.insurers)
update(add(Pat.doctors ← Clinic.staff))
In the example, the variable patAcceptsTreatment in-
dicates that Pat has agreed to be treated at the Clinic. As a
result, the program will update Pat’s policy to include the
Clinic’s staff in her authorized list of doctors, but only after
ensuring that the Clinic accepts payment from her insur-
ance provider.2
This example illustrates the purpose of the policy context
Q. The policy update statement executes only if the runtime
policy satisfies the label ordering relation that appears in the
second if-statement. This indicates that it is safe to assume
this label ordering when type-checking the update statement
since it will always be true when the statement executes.
The policy context Q is used to accumulate the result of
label ordering queries that appear in enclosing scopes and
2This example is a bit artificial: in practice, one would also need to
check that Pat .insurers is not empty (i.e. she has some insurance); such
a check could easily be added. Also, this check fails if Pat .insurers con-
tains some principal not in Clinic.insuranceCos. Handling the condition
correctly would require intersection roles that we have omitted for simplic-
ity in this paper.
is used to statically prove label orderings in the absence of
the runtime policy Π.
While straightforward, this program has a num-
ber of potential information leaks. Suppose that
patAcceptsTreatment is private to only Pat and staff
at the Clinic, but that the contents of Pat .doctors is pub-
lic. Then an adversary could learn the secret value of
patAcceptsTreatment by observing Pat .doctors. This
occurs because policy is essentially another kind of data,
which suggests we must protect it in the same way as
we protect variables. There is a similar dependency be-
tween between the contents of Clinic.insuranceCos and
Pat .insurers and the contents ofPat .doctors. The change to
the latter may indirectly reveal information to an adversary
about the former (i.e., that the members of Pat .insurers are
included in Clinic.insuranceCos). To address both cases,
we define metapolicy label of role ρ to be lab(ρ), and use
this label to protect policy information.
Protecting policy information involves both confiden-
tiality and integrity concerns. In particular, the depen-
dency between the variable patAcceptsTreatment and
the update to role Pat .doctors implies that the contents of
patAcceptsTreatment should be trusted by Pat ; other-
wise, a malicious adversary could modify this variable and
affect an unauthorized change to Pat’s policy. Therefore,
RX labels have the form (LC , LI), where LC describes the
confidentiality level and LI describes the integrity level. As
a result, we must define both confidentiality and integrity
of roles as well, with lab(ρ) = (C(ρ), I(ρ)). Here the
metapolicies C(ρ) and I(ρ) may depend on the owner of
the role ρ and delegation information in the current policy.
Section 3.5 will discuss possible choices of metapolicy.
Example 2. A program that leaks information across up-
dates to the policy in Figure 2. This transitive flow of infor-
mation is illegal, motivating RX’s transactional semantics.
Assume clinicRec is labeled Clinic.staff, and
patSymptoms labeled Pat .healthRecords, and philRec la-
beled DrPhil .self.
S1: if(Pat.healthRecords v Clinic.staff)
clinicRec := patSymptoms;
S2: if(leaveClinic)
update(del(Pat.doctors ← Clinic.staff));
S3: update(add(Clinic.staff ← {DrPhil}));
S4: if(Clinic.staff v DrPhil.self)
philRec := clinicRec
Here, patSymptoms contains data confidential to the
role Pat .healthRecords. Line S1 copies this data into the
Clinic records, which is permitted by the policy in Fig-
ure 2. If the patient decides to leave the clinic, represented
by the variable leaveClinic in line S2, the policy is up-
dated to remove the Clinic.staff from Pat .doctors. Subse-
quently, DrPhil joins the clinic and is therefore added as
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E .Ψ = · Ψ′ = (E .M, transQ S)
E , transQ S −→ E [Ψ = Ψ′], transQ S
(E-TR1)
E .Ψ 6= · E , S −→ E ′, S′
E , transQ S −→ E ′, transQ S′
(E-TR2)
E .Ψ 6= ·
E , transQ skip −→ E [Ψ = .], skip (E-TR3)
E .Ψ 6= · E , S  E ′, S′
E , transQ S −→ E ′, S′
(E-TR4)
Π′ = E .Π ∪ {s | add s ∈ ∆} \ {s | del s ∈ ∆}
E .Ψ = (M ′, transQ S) ∀q ∈ Q.(Π ` q)⇔ (Π′ ` q)
E , update∆ −→ E [Π = Π′], skip (E-UP)
Π′ = E .Π ∪ {s | add s ∈ ∆} \ {s | del s ∈ ∆}
E .Ψ = (M ′, transQ S) ∃q ∈ Q.(Π ` q) 6⇔ (Π′ ` q)
E , update∆ E [M = M ′][Π = Π′], transQ S
(R-UP)
E .Π ` q ⇒ j = 1 E .Π 6` q ⇒ j = 2
E , if (q) S1 S2 −→ E , Sj (E-IFQ)
E , S1  E ′, S
E , S1;S2  E ′, S
(R-SEQ)
Figure 5. RX execution (E , S −→ E ′, S′) and rollback (E , S  E ′, S′).
part of Clinic.staff. If this policy update succeeds, then
the program can copy data from the clinicRec variable
into philRec, which can be labeled by role DrPhil .self.
Consequently, DrPhil is able to view the patSymptoms
even though this information flow is permitted by neither
the original nor the new policy. This is an example of a un-
intended transitive flow. Other unintentional flows due to
the inconsistent update of policy are also possible.
In the example, the unintended flow is caused be-
cause the label ordering relation (Pat .healthRecords v
Clinic.staff) needed to justify the flow of information in the
assignment of S1 was violated by the update to policy. This
problem of unintentional flows motivates the support of a
transactional model [20, 30] to our language RX. The se-
mantics of a transaction transQ S is such that if, during
the execution of S, a policy update violates a label order-
ing relation necessary to show the absence of unintentional
flows, then the memory of the program is reverted to the
state it was prior to the start of the transaction. Execution
of the statement S then resumes using the updated policy.
The subscriptQ represents the policy invariant that must be
preserved across the policy updates.
Rolling back transactions, however, introduces yet an-
other channel of information leaks. To see why, sup-
pose that we enclose the program of Example 2 within a
transaction. Since the policy update statement is S2 vi-
olates the policy invariant that appears in S1, the trans-
action is rolled back, undoing the assignment to location
clinicRec. Any principal P who can view the contents
of clinicRec can therefore observe whether or not the
transaction has been rolled back. If the confidentiality of
leaveClinic is greater than clinicRec, then, by observ-
ing the rollback, the principal P will have gained informa-
tion about leaveClinic. The static semantics of RX—
explained in detail below—check transactions to guarantee
that no information leaks of this kind occur.
Note that such information leaks are not peculiar to our
choice of transaction rollback as the enforcement mecha-
nism for policy consistency. An alternative roll-forward
semantics, in which policy updates that violated consis-
tency were delayed until the transaction completed execu-
tion, would have similar issues [11].
For simplicity, in this paper we consider only policy up-
dates that contain statically-known, literal policy statements
(the s in add s or del s). However, the transaction seman-
tics just described also naturally supports first-class, dynam-
ically determined policy updates and queries, following in
the style of run-time principals [26] or dynamic labels [33].
3.3 RX Dynamic Semantics
The dynamic semantics of RX is defined by the execu-
tion relation E , S −→ E ′, S′ where E is the current execu-
tion configuration and S is the current program statement.
The execution takes a small step, resulting in a new config-
uration E ′ and a new statement S′ to be executed next. The
syntax for configurations and dynamic snapshots are:
eval configuration E ::= (Π,M,Ψ)
dynamic snapshot Ψ ::= · | (M,S)
An execution configuration consists of a policy Π; a mem-
ory store M mapping variables to values; and a possibly
empty dynamic snapshot Ψ of memory M and program
statement S used to implement transactional rollback.
The rules, shown in Figure 5, define two relations:
E , S −→ E ′, S′ for normal execution, and E , S  E ′, S′
for rollback. The rules for standard constructs (assignment,
addition, sequences etc.) are not shown.
The rules (E-TR1), (E-TR2), (E-TR3) and (E-TR4) are
for the execution of transaction statement transQ S. The
checks E .Ψ = · and E .Ψ 6= · determine if a snapshot Ψ is
available. (E-TR1) takes a new snapshot Ψ′ of the current
memory storeM and the current statement transQ S in the
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pc′=pc unionsq lab(q) q ∈ Φ.Q Γ; pc′;Q ∪ {q}; Φ ` S1 Γ; pc′;Q; Φ ` S2
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if (q) S1 S2 (T-IFQ)
Γ; pc; ∅; (pc, Q′) ` S
Γ; pc; ∅; · ` transQ′ S
(T-TR)
Q ` pc v lab(∆) Q ` pc v pc′ Q ` lab(Q′) v pc′
Γ; pc;Q; (pc′, Q′) ` update∆ (T-UP)
Q ` ` v ` Q ` `1 v ` Q ` ` v `2
Q ` `1 v `2
L1 v L2 ∈ Q
Q ` L1 v L2
Q ` LC1 v LC2 Q ` LI1 v LI2
Q ` (LC1 , LI1) v (LC2 , LI2)
Q ` (LC , LI) v ` Q ` `′ v `
Q ` (LC , LI) unionsq `′ v `
Q ` ` v (LC , LI) Q ` ` v `′
Q ` ` v (LC , LI) unionsq `′
Figure 6. RX typing (Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` S) and label ordering (Q ` `1 v `2).
execution context E , only if the current snapshot is empty.3
(E-TR2) is a congruence rule for evaluation within a trans-
action and (E-TR3) effectively commits. (E-TR4) uses the
rollback relation E , S  E ′, S′ triggered by failed updates
to abort a transaction.
(E-UP) takes the current policy E .Π and computes the
new policy Π′ by adding or deleting policy statements ac-
cording to∆ in the statement update∆. However, the new
policyΠ′ must be consistent with the query setQ which an-
notates the enclosing transaction statement transQ S, also
stored in the snapshot Ψ.
Formally, the policy consistency condition is:
∀q ∈ Q. (Π ` q)⇔ (Π′ ` q)
This consistency condition says that the satisfiability of ev-
ery query q in the query set Q is the same for the old pol-
icy and for the new policy. This condition is sufficient to
guarantee that every information flow witnessed during the
execution of the transaction under the old policy is also
consistent with the new policy. If the consistency condi-
tion fails, (R-UP) is triggered instead, rolling back using
(R-SEQ) to discard the second statement of any sequence
statement S1;S2, and completing the abort using (E-TR4).
If the consistency condition fails, (E-TR4) together with
(R-UP) is triggered instead, rolling back using (R-SEQ) by
discarding the second statement of the sequence statement
S1;S2. Note that policy updates that occur in a transac-
tion are treated like I/O operations in traditional transaction
systems [20, 10]—only writes to memory are undone by
a rollback, policy updates are left intact. This means that
pending updates in a transaction may not have been per-
formed before the rollback operation. As with traditional
transaction systems, we could use compensations [29] to
allow programmers to undo some updates if necessary. An-
other consequence of not rolling back policy updates is that
3We support only non-nested transactions for simplicity, as discussed
in Section 3.4, so no stack of snapshots is needed.
it is possible for badly written programs to enter livelock—
for instance, a transaction that performs mutually incom-
patible policy updates can cause the rollback mechanism to
enter an infinite loop.
Finally, (E-IFQ) for the policy query statement chooses
the appropriate branch to take according to the judgment
E .Π ` q; that is, whether or not the query q holds in the
current policy Π. This judgment is defined as follows (note
the contravariance):
Π ` L1 v L2 ⇐⇒ [[L2]]Π ⊆ [[L1]]Π
Based on the definition of L, the interpretation of [[L]]Π
depends on the semantics of roles [[ρ]]Π (Section 2.3), and
the semantics of a role’s confidentiality and integrity labels,
C(ρ) and I(ρ), respectively, which are also treated as sets
of principals.
Example 3. A program that, executes under the policy
{A.r ← B.r,B.r ← {B}}, rolls back:
trans{A.rvB.r}
if(A.r v B.r) {
update(del(A.r ← B.r)); S }
Execution of this program begins with the (E-TR1) rule
which takes a snapshot of the memory and program and
records it in Ψ. Notice that the subscript {A.r v B.r} on
the transaction statement is a set that includes the lone pol-
icy query that occurs in the body of the transaction. (E-
TR2) now applies and with the program taking a small step
using (E-IFQ). Since the role A.r delegates to B.r, the
policy entails the query (E .Π ` q ⇒ j = 1), the then-
branch of the statement is taken. We now have a sequence
of the statements with the first being an update statement
update(del(A.r ← B.r)), all enclosed in a transac-
tion statement from the first line.
In attempting to apply the (E-TR2) rule again, the first
statement in sequence must take a step under the normal
execution relation −→ (according to the standard rule for
evaluating sequences, which is omitted here). In this case
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the policy consistency condition is violated by the update
since, under the new policy ({B.r ← {B}}), the policy
query (A.r v B.r) is not satisfied, unlike under the old
policy. Therefore, the first statement of the sequence can
only take a step under the rollback relation . Then, we use
(E-TR4) with (R-SEQ) preceded by (R-UP) in the premise.
The conclusion of (R-SEQ) serves to discard the statement
S that succeeds the update statement. The result is that the
program and memory is reverted to its original state and the
policy is now {B.r ← {B}}.
3.4 RX Static Semantics
The static semantics of RX is defined by the typing rela-
tion Ω ` S in Figure 6, just like the typing relation for RX0
in Figure 3. However, the typing context Ω now contains a
static snapshot for type checking transactions:
typing context Ω ::= (Γ; pc;Q; Φ)
policy context Q ::= {L1 v L1′ , . . . , Ln v Ln′}
static snapshot Φ ::= · | (pc, Q)
Hence, we also write the typing judgment as Γ; pc;Q; Φ `
S. The type binding for variables Γ and the program counter
pc are standard, and the policy context is already defined
Figure 4 (but expanded here for easy reference). The snap-
shot Φ is used to approximate the assumptions of a transac-
tion (to be explained below).
Label ordering and metapolicy labels Figure 6 (the
third and the fourth rows) also specifies the label ordering
relation Q ` `1 v `2. In the third row of Figure 6, the three
rules of label ordering are straightforward: the left and the
middle rules say that the relation is reflexive and transitive,
and the right rule makes use of the policy context Q when
the labels L1 and L2 are atomic. In the fourth row of Fig-
ure 6, the left rule handles the compound label (LC , LI),
and the middle and the right rules handle the join label `unionsq`′.
We also need the following auxiliary function lab(·) to
compute the metapolicy label of policy updates ∆ and pol-
icy queries Q:
lab(∆) =
⊔
add s,del s∈∆ lab(roledef (s))
lab(Q) =
⊔
q∈Q lab(q)
lab(L1 v L2) = lab(L1) unionsq lab(L2)
lab(C(ρ)) = lab(ρ)
lab(I(ρ)) = lab(ρ)
lab(ρ) = (C(ρ), I(ρ))
The function lab(·) uses the metapolicy C(·) and I(·) to
construct a label for a role. A metapolicy label for queries
L1 v L2 is the join of all the metapolicy labels for roles
contained in L1 and L2.
Typing policy queries The rule (T-IFQ) type checks pol-
icy query statement if (q) S1 S2. The rule has three impor-
tant aspects. First, notice that we check the true-branch S1
using policy context Q ∪ {q}, that is, the union of the cur-
rent policy context and the query being asked. Second, both
branches are checked using a restricted program counter la-
bel pc′, which is defined as the join of the current pc la-
bel and the label of the query q according to the label set
function lab(q). This reflects the information gained by
querying the policy, and is used to prevent leaks about a pol-
icy through assignments to variables. Finally, the premise
q ∈ Φ.Q is used to ensure transaction consistency, which
we will explain when we consider the typing rule for trans-
actions below.
Example 4. An instantiation of the typing rule (T-IFQ)
for policy queries for Example 1. (Here we abbreviate
Clinic.insuranceCos and Pat .insurers to save space.)
pc′=pc unionsq lab(Clinic.ins v Pat .ins)
Clinic.ins v Pat .ins ∈ Φ.Q
Γ; pc′;Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins}; Φ ` update ...
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if (Clinic.ins v Pat .ins) update ...
where lab(Clinic.ins v Pat .ins) is
(C(Clinic.ins), I(Clinic.ins))
unionsq (C(Pat .ins), I(Pat .ins))
Typing transactions The snapshot Φ is used to ensure
that every policy query q that appears in the body S of a
transaction transQ′ S also appears in Q′. This is ensured
by the (T-TR) rule, whose body S is checked in a Φ snap-
shot that mentions Q′, and the (T-IFQ) rule, whose premise
q ∈ Φ.Q ensures that every policy query is accounted for.
The (T-TR) rule also includes the current program counter
label pc inΦ. Doing this guarantees that the memory effects
that occur when a transaction is rolled back do not leak in-
formation. We explain how this works when considering
the (T-UP) rule below.
Notice that (T-TR) must occur in an empty policy con-
text. We did this to prevent nested transactions, which sim-
plifies the dynamic semantics and typing rules. Support-
ing nested transactions would require a flow-sensitive static
analysis if we were to support partial rollback (in which in-
ner transactions roll back but outer ones do not). Such an
approach would also increase the precision of the static se-
mantics and permit more updates. Ultimately, we want to
extend RX with procedures, which will increase the need
for nested transactions; i.e., to allow transaction-containing
procedures to compose.
Also notice that these rules effectively prevent policy
queries from occurring outside a transaction. This is to pre-
vent aberrant behavior in which an update occurring within
a transaction has a conflict with non-transactional query
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outside the transaction; in this case, rolling back would not
solve the problem, and the program would resume execu-
tion under the new policy while still not satisfying the non-
transactional query.
Typing policy updates The (T-UP) rule defines the con-
ditions under which policy may be safely modified. Recall
that the metapolicy label of a role ρ is (C(ρ), I(ρ)), where
the metapolicy C(ρ) is the set of principals who are permit-
ted to view the members of ρ, and the metapolicy I(ρ) is
the set of principals that trust ρ’s definition. As motivated
by the discussion of Example 1, we must be careful to only
allow a program to update the definition of a role ρ when
doing so is trusted by those in I(ρ); this is a condition sim-
ilar to robust declassification [31].
Moreover, the change in a role definition ρ should only
reveal information to principals in C(ρ). This condition is
checked by the first premise of (T-UP) in a manner analo-
gous to the rule for the assignment statement in Figure 3. In
particular, the pc must be lower than both the integrity and
confidentiality levels of the role, thus ensuring that it is not
improperly updated, and that its update does not leak infor-
mation. Note that to ensure that only the owner of a role
is permitted to modify its definition, any metapolicy I(ρ)
must include the owner of the role.
Example 5. An instantiation of the typing rule (T-UP) for
policy updates in Figure 6. Suppose we enclose Example 1
as statement S in a transaction transQ′ S. Hence we wish
to prove Γ; pc;Q; · ` transQ′ S with
Γ ≡ patAcceptsTreatment : (C(Pat .drs), I(Pat .drs))
pc ≡ (C(Pat .drs), I(Pat .drs))
The label (C(Pat .drs), I(Pat .drs)) for the variable
patAcceptsTreatment determines whether Pat’s role
Pat .drs should be updated. The pc here will be added to
the snapshot Φ by (T-TR). Later, within (T-IFQ) derivation
shown earlier, we type check the update and apply the (T-
UP) rule as follows:
Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins} ` pc′ v lab(Pat .drs)
Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins} ` pc′ v pc
Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins} ` lab(Q′) v pc
Γ; pc′;Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins}; (pc, Q′) `
add(Pat .drs← Clinic.staff)
where
pc′ ≡ pc unionsq (C(Clinic.ins), I(Clinic.ins))
unionsq (C(Pat .ins), I(Pat .ins))
lab(Pat .drs) ≡ (C(Pat .drs), I(Pat .drs))
If Q were ∅, it would not be sufficient to prove the first
premise according to the label ordering rules in Figure 6.
This is because {Clinic.ins v Pat .ins} alone has nothing
to say about the relationship between the metapolicies of
the various roles. It would be sufficient to choose
Q ≡ { C(Clinic.ins) v C(Pat .drs),
C(Pat .ins) v C(Pat .drs),
I(Clinic.ins) v I(Pat .drs),
I(Pat .ins) v I(Pat .drs) }
Such a context Q could be established by preceding the
code S in Example 1 with policy queries testing these as-
sertions within the transaction. Rather than expect the pro-
grammer to write these, they could be straightforwardly
inferred. To type these queries (and the one already in
S) would require we choose Q′ ⊇ Q ∪ {Clinic.ins v
Pat .ins}.
The decision of whether or not an update causes a roll-
back depends on the policy consistency condition (∀q ∈
Q. Π ` q = Π′ ` q) appearing in the operational rules
(E-UP) and (R-UP) in Figure 5. We want to avoid leaking
information about the queries through low-security data and
low-security policy. The first case is handled by the second
premise of the (T-UP) rule. It ensures that all memory ef-
fects in a transaction are bounded from below by pc label
of the current context. As explained earlier (Section 3.1)
for Example 2, this guarantees that the change to memory
caused by the rollback of a transaction is observable only by
principals who are also permitted to view the effects of the
context in which the update occurs. In our example typing
above, Q clearly satisfies this condition because it asserts
that each component of the pc label is higher than each of
the components in pc′ that do not already include pc.
The second case of a leak via policy is handled by the
third premise (Q ` lab(Q′) v pc′) of (T-UP), which
requires that all the invariants mentioned in Q′ are at a
lower security level than the program counter label at the
start of the transaction. This ensures that the effects to
memory that occur as a result of rollback are at a higher
security level than all the policy queries. Therefore, the
principals that can observe the effects to memory as a re-
sult of rollback are also sufficiently privileged to view the
definitions of roles mentioned in Q′. Thus policy infor-
mation is not leaked into memory as a result of rollback.
In our example typing, this third premise is clearly satis-
fied because lab(Q′) = (C(DrBob.ins), I(DrBob.ins)) unionsq
(C(Pat .ins), I(Pat .ins)).
3.5 Metapolicy for Role Labeling
RX uses metapolicies C(ρ) and I(ρ) to protect the con-
fidentiality and integrity, respectively, of a role ρ. Because
metapolicies are labels, they must be interpreted as sets of
principals; i.e. [[C(ρ)]]Π = {P1, . . . , Pn} for some princi-
pals Pi, and similarly for I(ρ). Here we discuss possible
interpretations of C(ρ) and I(ρ) in turn, and ultimately de-
fine a sufficient condition for metapolicy interpretations that
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enables proving noninterference. The particular features of
RT0 policies for defining sets have a heavy influence on
what determines a reasonable interpretation.
A simple interpretation for role confidentiality is
[[C(ρ)]]Π = ⊥. Here, ⊥ denotes the set of all principals,
so that under this metapolicy every principal can know the
contents of all roles. While simple, this metapolicy requires
policy update decisions to be independent of secret data, as
shown in Example 1.
To define C(ρ) to be more restrictive, RT0 semantics re-
quires at the least that [[C(ρ)]]Π ⊇ {owner(ρ)}. That is, we
must permit the owner to view the definition of the role. In
addition, a principal P should be able to learn of its mem-
bership in a role ρ. Were this not so, there would be no
observable effect if P was removed from the role, and so its
initial membership would be fairly useless. Thus an intu-
itive choice would to have [[C(ρ)]]Π = [[ρ]]Π ∪{owner(ρ)}.
That is, members of ρ are permitted to view its definition,
which would include themselves and the other members of
the role. A stronger anonymity policy might allow a princi-
pal to learn of its own membership but not that of others [9].
This is not expressible in terms of C(ρ), but even if it were,
it is not clear how it could be enforced. In particular, if some
variable x were labeled with such a ρ, and a program acting
on the authority of principal P were to modify this variable,
other principals in ρ could observe the effect of this change
and conclude P was a member of ρ.
Though intuitive, allowing C(ρ) to include all the mem-
bers of ρ is not enough; it could still reveal information.
To see why, consider the example from Figure 2. In the
example, the definition of the role Pat .doctors given by a
membership statement including DrSue and a delegation
to Clinic.staff; the interpretation of the role is given by
[[Pat .doctors]]Π = {DrAlice,DrBob,DrSue}. Under this
choice of metapolicy, we permit DrSue to view the defini-
tion of Pat .doctors. By doing so, even though DrSue is
not a member of Clinic.staff, she can ascertain the mem-
bership of Clinic.staff, since she knows that DrAlice and
DrBob are in Pat .doctors. Realizing that the definition of
Pat .doctors depends on the definition of Clinic.staff makes
it clear that it is not reasonable to treat the policy state-
ments defining Clinic.staff as being more confidential than
the those defining Pat .doctors.
To remedy this problem, we can require the interpreta-
tion of C(ρ) to satisfy the following condition. Given a
relation delΠ(ρ) that specifies the set of roles ρi to which ρ
delegates (either directly or transitively), we must have both
the condition [[ρ]]Π ⊆ [[C(ρ)]]Π and:
delΠ(ρ) = {ρ1, . . . , ρn} ⇒ ∀i. [[C(ρ)]]Π ⊆ [[C(ρi)]]Π
Note that an interpretation that satisfies these conditions
must also be robust under policy updates. A simple way to
ensure this is to allow the semantics of role confidentiality
to change with the update. While simple, this would permit
members of one role to view another role by delegating to
it. To prevent this we could require that for an update to
add a delegation statement A.r ← B.r the integrity of the
pc must be trusted by both I(A.r) and I(B.r). We leave
exploration of this issue to future work.
Similar choices are possible for the definition of the role
integrity metapolicy I(ρ). The simplest choice is to have
[[I(ρ)]]Π = ⊥, which means that the policy is trusted by all
principals, and thus policy updates can occur only in con-
texts trusted by all principals. In general, the condition on
the interpretation for integrity mirrors the condition on con-
fidentiality, replacing C(ρ) with I(ρ) in the equation above.
To see how this makes sense, consider the policy in Figure 2
once again. The delegation Pat .doctors← Clinic.staff in-
dicates that Pat trusts Clinic to partially manage the defi-
nition of Pat .doctors through the definition of Clinic.staff.
As such, a reasonable choice for metapolicy I(ρ) would be
that ρ is trusted by owner(ρ) and the owners of all roles that
transitively delegate to ρ.
A further condition on metapolicies C(ρ) and I(ρ) is in-
duced by our definition of lab(C(ρ)) and lab(I(ρ)). This
is necessary since the result of a policy query of the form
C(ρ) v L carries information about the confidentiality of ρ
as opposed to information about ρ itself. In Section 3.4, we
defined lab(C(ρ)) ≡ lab(ρ) and lab(I(ρ)) ≡ lab(ρ). This
means that the confidentiality of the metapolicy governing a
role is the same as the confidentiality of the role itself. This
choice avoids the need for higher-order metapolicies.
To appreciate the implications of this choice we can view
C(·) and I(·) as functions that map roles to sets of princi-
pals. The result of this function might depend on its in-
put ρ, and possibly on the definition of some other roles
{ρ1, . . . , ρn} that appear in the policy. In such a case, since
C(ρ) carries information about ρ and ρ1, . . . , ρn, the label
of C(ρ) should be as below: (unionsqiC(ρi)) unionsq C(ρ). To be able
to claim that lab(C(ρ)) ≡ lab(ρ) the metapolicy must sat-
isfy the following condition:
∀i.[[C(ρ)]]Π ⊆ [[C(ρi)]]Π
An identical condition must also hold true for I(ρ). The
specific metapolicies described previously in terms of the
delegation relation delΠ(ρ) satisfy this constraint.
4 Noninterference
This section proves a noninterference property for RX.
Informally speaking, we show that if an RX program S
is well-formed according to the static semantics, then the
effects of executing that program visible to a low-security
observer are independent of the high-security parts of the
configuration elements M and Π (i.e., memory and policy)
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with which the program executes. Updates to policy inten-
tionally alter the security behavior of the program, possi-
bly revealing previously secret information [11]. Therefore,
rather than providing an end-to-end security guarantee with
respect to a single policy, we prove that information flows
observable by a principal at a given point in time are consis-
tent with the current policy. Since our formulation of policy
and data integrity is conceptually identical to our formula-
tion of confidentiality, this property of noninterference also
yields a preservation property for the integrity of policy and
data. We do not consider timing channels.
The statement of noninterference relies on the notion of
a well-formed configuration. We write Ω |= E to mean that
the execution context is consistent with the static assump-
tions made while type-checking the program.
Definition 6. A configuration E = (Π,M,Ψ) is well-
formed with respect to a context Ω, denoted Ω |= E , if and
only if all of the following are true:
dom(M) ≡ dom(Ω.Γ) (1)
∀q ∈ Ω.Q . Π ` q (2)
if Ψ = (M ′, S′) then
Ω ` S′ (3.1)
dom(M ′) = dom(Ω.Γ) (3.2)
∀x.M(x) 6= M ′(x)⇒ Π ` Ω.pc v Ω.Γ(x) (3.3)
The clauses in the definition above are mostly straight-
forward. Clause (2) connects the static approximation Q
used during type checking to the runtime policy Π. To
ensure this connection is sound, we prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 7 (Label Ordering Soundness). For all contexts Ω
and programs S, if the derivation of Ω ` S contains a sub-
derivation Ω′ ` S, then the following holds true for all
policies Π:
(∀q ∈ Ω′.Q.Π ` q)⇒ (∀`1, `2.Q ` `1 v `2 ⇒ Π ` `1 v `2)
Clause (3.3) states that all effects on memory exhibited
during a transaction are bounded above the pc lower-bound
used to statically check the transaction.
We prove noninterference by relating execution traces
of well-formed configurations, restricted to an attacker’s
level of observation. An execution of a configuration
(E0, S0) (where E0 = (Π,M,Ψ)) is written 〈E0, S0〉
and denotes a (possibly infinite) sequence of configura-
tions E0, . . . , En, . . . and programs S0, . . . , Sn, . . . such that
(Ei, Si) −→ (Ei+1, Si+1). The sequence of config-
urations E0, . . . , En, . . . is called the trace and is written
Tr(〈E0, S0〉). We write α to denote a (possibly empty) se-
quence of configurations, and E , α to denote the concatena-
tion of a single configuration and a sequence.
We define the attacker’s observation level as a set of roles
R. The restriction of a trace α to observation levelR is writ-
ten α|R, and is defined in Figure 7. As long as the policy
Role :
Obs(R,Π) ≡ {ρ | ∃ρ′ ∈ R. Π ` C(ρ) v ρ′}
Policy :
Π|R ≡ Π‖Obs(R,Π)
∅‖R ≡ ∅ ({s} ∪Π′)‖R ≡
 {s} ∪ (Π′‖R) roledef (s) ∈ R
Π′‖R otherwise
Memory :
M|R,Π ≡ {(x,M(x)) | ∃ρ ∈ R. Π ` Γ(x) v ρ}
Transaction snapshot :
·|R,Π ≡ . (M,S)|R,Π = (M|R,Π, S)
Configuration :
(Π,M,Ψ)|R ≡ (Π|R,M|R,Π, ·)
Trace :
(E1, E2, α)|R ≡
 E1|R if Obs(R, E2.Π) 6⊆ Obs(R, E1.Π)
E1|R, (E2, α)|R otherwise
Figure 7. Trace observability.
remains unchanged, a restricted trace consists of a restric-
tion to each configuration element of the trace (the “other-
wise” clause of the (E1, E2, α)|R definition of the figure). In
doing so, we restrict the view of memory according the pol-
icy Π and the Ω.Γ used to type check the initial program.
We restrict the policy according to the metapolicy C(ρ),
which must satisfy the condition described in Section 3.5.
However, if a policy update results in a declassification that
causes the set of observable role definitions to increase then
the trace is truncated (the first clause of the (E1, E2, α) |R
definition of the figure). Note that declassifications to ob-
servers at an unrelated observation level do not cause the
trace to be truncated. Similarly, a policy update that causes
a reduction in the privilege of an observer at levelR (a revo-
cation) has no impact on trace truncation. This truncation is
justified since declassifications due to policy update are in-
tentional releases of information. These ideas are captured
by the two clauses of (E1, E2, α)|R.
Note that we make no attempt to restrict the observabil-
ity of a program configuration while the program executes
within a transaction. This makes it reasonable to exclude
the snapshot Ψ when defining the observability of a config-
uration. However, for our statement of non-interference, it
is useful to identify configurations while taking into account
the transaction context, so we define (Π,M,Ψ)|ψR ≡ (Π|R
,M|R,Π,Ψ|R,Π).
The definition of trace observability implies that compu-
tation steps are only observable if they have an effect on an
observable part of memory or policy. This entails that we
identify traces only up to stuttering. We write α .= β if α
and β are equivalent up to stuttering.
We can now state the noninterference theorem.
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Theorem 8 (Noninterference). Suppose for an RX program
S and a pair of configurations E0 and E1, there exists a
context Ω such that Ω ` S, Ω |= E0 and Ω |= E1. Then,
for any set of roles R, whenever both 〈E0, S〉 and 〈E1, S〉
terminate, we have
E0 |ψR ≡ E1 |ψR ⇒ Tr(〈E0, S〉) |R .= Tr(〈E1, S〉) |R
The proof (in our technical report [25]) uses Pottier and
Simonet’s proof technique [18] which extends the language
to represent pairs of executions that differ only in the high-
security parts of their configurations. Because we may trun-
cate traces for which there is a declassification visible at
level R, to obtain an end-to-end security guarantee we can
apply noninterference piecewise to each non-declassifying
sub-trace. Thus we can claim that (1) the execution is non-
interfering until the policy is updated; (2) the act of updating
the policy itself does not leak information; and (3) after the
policy has been updated all subsequent flows are consistent
with the new policy.
5 Related Work
There is a large body of work on policy specification lan-
guages, including owned policies [4] and role-based lan-
guages like Cassandra [2], RBAC [19], SPKI [7, 8], and
owned policies [4]. RX policies are based on those from RT
framework by Li, Mitchell and Winsborough [14], which
is similar to SPKI/SDSI [13]. The RX transaction se-
mantics is inspired by software transactional memory [22],
an idea which has gained popularity as an alternative to
pessimistic lock-based synchronization for implementing
atomic blocks [20, 30, 10].
There has been much prior work on language-based en-
forcement of information-flow policies [21]. The majority
of that research has assumed that the security lattice and
other policy components are known at compile-time and re-
main fixed for the duration of the program execution.
In some information flow languages the policy remains
fixed but may be discovered at run time by using dynamic
queries. Banerjee and Naumann [1] permit information-
flow policies to be mixed with stack-inspection style dy-
namic access control checks. The Jif programming lan-
guage [16] supports dynamic queries of the security lattice
and includes features for using both dynamic principals and
dynamic labels [26, 33, 27]. The latest version of Jif also al-
lows delegations between principals to change at run time;
however, Jif has no transactions or formalisms to show the
absence of information leaks across updates.
The predecessor [11] of this paper showed that unre-
stricted updates to the security lattice could violate sound-
ness in languages supporting dynamic policy queries, and
proposed delaying updates until soundness could be en-
sured, as determined by a run-time examination of the pro-
gram. RX builds on this work by reasoning about fine-
grained policy updates within a program (in our prior work
they were out-of-band), and by using roles and metapolicies
to form an administrative model (the term metapolicy is due
to Hosmer [12]).
There has been recent interest in studying temporal poli-
cies which are permitted to change in predefined ways
during execution. Recent work on flow locks by Broberg
and Sands [3] can encode many recently-proposed tempo-
ral policies, including declassification policies [5], erasure
policies [6], and lexically-scoped flow policies [15]. RX is
designed to support unrestricted changes to policy during
execution. While RX currently supports updates ∆ using
literal statements s, the intent of transactional rollback is to
support partially-unknown changes, following techniques
of dynamic labels and run-time principals. When policies
updates cause declassifications, our noninterference guar-
antee is similar to the noninterference until conditions prop-
erty provided by Chong and Myers [5]. Both our defini-
tions of noninterference consider only declassification-free
subtraces of the execution. Our noninterference guarantee
however permits certain classes of declassifications to occur
without necessitating a truncation of the trace.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented RX, a security-typed language
that supports dynamic updates to role-based information-
flow policies. The main contributions of this work are:
(1) The novel use of role-based policies to provide a nat-
ural administrative model for managing policies in long-
running programs. (2) A language design that allows pro-
grammatic addition and deletion of the policy statements
that define roles along with a transaction mechanism that
ensures that policies are applied consistently. (3) The novel
use of metapolicies for preventing illegal flows of informa-
tion through changes to policy. (4) A static type system and
accompanying proof that the type system enforces a form
of noninterference.
Although we have not studied the issue here, we expect
that the transactional approach will scale better to systems
with concurrent threads, each of which might try to up-
date the global information-flow policy concurrently. The
transactional model is also likely to be useful when policy
updates are asynchronous, or in a distributed environment.
The techniques presented in this paper provide some of the
groundwork for achieving our long-term objective of han-
dling these idioms.
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